




Cancelling of Insurance Contracts
Brekelmans, R.C.M.; De Waegenaere, A.M.B.
Publication date:
1999
Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Brekelmans, R. C. M., & De Waegenaere, A. M. B. (1999). Cancelling of Insurance Contracts. (CentER
Discussion Paper; Vol. 1999-60). Operations research.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 12. May. 2021







In this paper we consider an insurer who has incomplete information about the
claim frequency of the risk process. He therefore calculates the premium on the basis
of a prior distribution for the claim frequency. Future information might then reveal
that it is no longer optimal for the insurer to continue to offer the insurance under
the current conditions. We consider a model where, at certain points in time, the
insurer can decide to cancel the insurance, possibly at the expense of canceling costs.
The model is applicable to long-period, client tailored insurance contracts as well as
insurance offered to large groups of insureds on a single period basis. We derive the
optimal canceling policy and analyze the influence of the different model parameters
on the expected lifetime of the insurance, the insurer’s expected surplus, and the safety
loading.
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1 Introduction
The classical risk process, as introduced in [3], describes the evolution over time of the surplus
generated by an insurance portfolio. This surplus consists of premium income reduced with
claim amounts. Claims arrive according to a homogeneous Poisson process, and claim heights
are i.i.d. and independent of the claim arrival process. The aggregate premium income over
a time interval of length t equals pt, where p denotes the premium density. It is determined
such that, for any given time interval, the expected surplus equals a safety loading θ times the
expected aggregate claim amount. For given claim frequency and claim height distribution,
the safety loading can be varied to affect the stability of the portfolio. Several criteria for
stability exist, among which the probability of ruin is the most prominent one (see for example
[4], for an overview on the literature).
In the above described classical risk process, the insurer offers insurance at a given,
constant, premium density, for the whole length of the planning horizon. Stability criteria
can then be determined on the basis of this assumption. This assumption is relevant in
cases where the claim frequency and the claim height distribution are constant over time,
and known to the insurer at the start of the planning horizon. When the above assumptions
are not satisfied, stability is also largely influenced by the insurer’s policy with regard to
maintaining the current premium system. Grandell [7] therefore describes a generalized risk
model where claim frequency is time dependent, and the premium density is continuously
adjusted to new estimates of the claim frequency.
We consider a situation where claim frequency is constant, but unknown to the insurer.
This may in particular be the case for development of new, or client tailored, insurance
products, where little historical data is available to the insurer. An estimate of the claim
frequency is then used to decide on contract specifications. After some time, observed
information might indicate that it is no longer optimal to continue to offer the insurance
under the current conditions. However, estimates of the claim frequency can become more
accurate over time, and, moreover, the decision to stop offering the insurance can be costly
to the insurer. Therefore, in a discrete time framework, a trade-off arises between continuing
with the premium system one more period, so that in the next period the decision can be
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made with more reliable information, and stopping to offer the insurance now, at higher
canceling cost.
Our aim is to determine the optimal strategy with regard to canceling. At each decision
moment, the optimal decision rule weighs, conditional on the history of the risk process, the
expected future surplus that results from continuing the contract—taking into account all
available options at future decisions moments—against the canceling costs. With regard to
the cost of canceling we consider two situations, depending on contract specifications. In
the first case, which arises typically in case of large, client tailored, insurance contracts, the
insurer in principal commits to insure the risk for a given number of time periods, but has
the option to cancel earlier. Exercising this option however implies that the insured has to
be compensated for the fact that he will have to renegotiate insurance for the remaining
periods. In the second case, which occurs in case of insurance offered to a large group of
insureds on a yearly basis, the insurer has no commitment to offer the insurance for more
than one year, and can therefore cancel without any compensation to the insured.
If the option to cancel the contract is available to the insurer, this clearly affects the value
of the portfolio for him. In case of precommitment, it also affects the insured’s expected
utility of the insurance offered to him. Whether for the insurer a premium density is sufficient
to cover the risk, and whether for the insured, it is acceptable, will depend on the effective
safety loading, which equals the fraction of expected total surplus over expected total costs
at the end of the contract, given that the optimal canceling strategy is applied. Since total
costs consist of claim amounts augmented with canceling costs, and since the option to
cancel is available, the effective safety loading in general differs from the safety loading used
to determine the premium density.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2 the general model is presented. In Section 3 we use
stochastic dynamic programming to derive the optimal canceling strategy for the case where
the insurer uses Bayesian updating of the claim frequency distribution. The optimal decision
rule is of the following form. For each future decision moment there is a threshold value such
that the insurer should cancel iff the past claim frequency exceeds this value. The threshold
value at a certain time instance depends on: the remaining number of periods in the planning
horizon, the accuracy of the prior distribution, the safety loading, and the cancellation costs.
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In Section 4, we determine the effective safety loading. Section 5 concludes.
2 General model
We consider the classical risk process, as in e.g. [3] or [5], over planning horizon [0, T ]. Let
{Nt : t ≥ 0} denote the claim arrival process, i.e. Nt denotes the number of claims that
arrive during the period [0, t]. The claim arrival process is a homogeneous Poisson process
with parameter λ > 0. The claim amounts {Xn : n ∈ IN} are i.i.d. and independent of
the claim arrival process. Finally, St denotes the aggregate claim amount up to epoch t,





Let P (t1, t2) denote the premium received for the risk covered by the insurer in the time
interval (t1, t2], (0 ≤ t1 < t2 ≤ T ). The premium is determined using the expected value
premium principle (see e.g. [6]). This implies that the pure premium, i.e. premium net of
transaction costs, taxes, etc., is proportional to the expected value of the insured risk—at
the time the contract is signed. With given claim frequency λ, this implies that:
P (t1, t2) = (1 + θ)E[St2 − St1],
= (1 + θ)λµ(t2 − t1),
= p(t2 − t1),
where θ ≥ 0 denotes the safety loading, µ = E[Xi] is the expected claim height, and p =
(1 + θ)λµ denotes the premium density (see e.g. [2]).
The insurer however does not know the exact value of the claim frequency, λ, and therefore
uses a prior distribution:
Λ ∼ Gamma(t0, λ0t0),
to calculate the premium to cover the risk in [0, T ], so that the premium density used at
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date zero equals:
p = (1 + θ)E[Λ]µ,
= (1 + θ)λ0µ.
The above premium is determined using the information available at date zero. At time
t, new information about the claim arrival process is available. Let Ht denote the history of
the claim arrival process up to time t, i.e.
Ht = σ{Nu : 0 ≤ u ≤ t}.
This information can be used to update the initial prior distribution to a posterior distribu-
tion using the theory of Bayesian updating. Given that Nt claims have arrived in [0, t], the
posterior distribution is as follows (see e.g. [1]):
Λ|Ht ∼ Gamma (t0 + t, λ0t0 +Nt) . (1)
In the sequel we will denote E[·|Ht] for the expectation with respect to the posterior
distribution at time t. Based on this posterior distribution, the expected claim frequency
equals:




so that, for any u ≥ t, the expected value of aggregate claim amounts in (t, u] equals:
E[Su − St|Ht] = λtµ(u − t).
Now, since premium income is fixed, the estimated claim frequency at time t implies
that, for any future time interval (t, u], the estimated safety loading θt satisfies:
p(t− u) = (1 + θt)E[Su − St|Ht],
⇔ (1 + θ)λ0µ = (1 + θt)λtµ,




so that θt is lower than θ whenever λt is higher than λ0. Therefore, depending on the
value of λt, it may be optimal for the insurer to stop offering the insurance at the given
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premium density. This decision however will also depend on contract specifications. In case
of precommitment, the insurer may need to pay a cancellation fee to compensate for the
renegotiation costs the insured will incur in order to obtain new insurance. Renegotiation
and contracting costs are often assumed to be proportional to the pure premium of risk that
has to be insured. Therefore, if the contract is canceled at time t = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1, the
insurer incurs a cost:
K(t) = cP (t, T ) = cp(T − t),
for a given c ≥ 0. The case where the insurer is allowed to cancel without any compensation
to the insured corresponds to c = 0.
Finally, notice here that at time t, the estimated expected claim frequency, λt, as defined
in (2), contains all the necessary information available in Ht to compute the posterior dis-
tribution of Λ|Ht. Indeed, λt = λ implies that Λ|Ht ∼ Gamma(t0 + t, λ(t0 + t)). Therefore,
in the sequel we will denote E[·|λt = λ] for the expectation with respect to the posterior
distribution at time t, given that λt = λ. In the next section, we derive the optimal policy
with regard to canceling.
3 The canceling rule
At epoch t = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1, the insurer can decide whether he wants to continue the
insurance. This implies that, at epoch t, he can use the information inHt to choose between
the following two options:
• Continue with the contract at least one more period. This implies that the surplus
generated in (t, t+ 1] equals
Cnc(t) = p− St+1 + St.
After this period the surplus generated in (t + 1, T ] depends on future decisions to
cancel or continue with the contract in a certain period.
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• Cancel the contract at epoch t. This implies that the surplus generated in (t, t+ 1] is
equal to the canceling cost, i.e.
Cc(t) = −cp(T − t),
and no surplus is generated in (t+ 1, T ].
Now let L denote the actual number of periods the contract sustains, i.e. the time until









Xn − cp(T − L).
The aim is to determine the optimal L, given that canceling is costly, and that information
becomes more reliable over time. A “naive” strategy for the insurer would be to cancel as soon
as the updated claim frequency implies that the expected surplus that results from continuing
with the contract until epoch T is lower than the surplus that results from canceling the





∣∣∣∣λt] < E[Cc(t) |λt] ⇔
E
[
p(T − t)− ST + St |λt
]
< −cp(T − t) ⇔









= (1 + c)(1 + θ)λ0. (3)
Then the above strategy is of the control-limit type, i.e. cancel the contract as soon as the
estimated claim frequency exceeds a certain, constant, limit λ̃. However, in early periods
the information may still be relatively unreliable. Future estimates of the claim frequency
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may reveal that the contract is favorable. Whereas canceling is an irreversible decision, not
canceling at the current period still leaves the option to cancel in later periods. The value
of this option is not taken into account in the naive control-limit strategy.
In order to be able to take into account all future options, we use stochastic dynamic
programming to determine the optimal policy with regard to canceling. The optimality
equation that characterizes dynamic programming (see e.g. [8]) follows by considering the
two options “canceling” and “not canceling”. It is the option “not canceling” that yields the
recursion forward in time. Therefore, we define the functions:
VT (λ) = 0,
Vt(λ) = max
{
E[Cc(t) |λt = λ], E[Cnc(t) + Vt+1(λt+1) |λt = λ]
}
, t = 0, . . . , T − 1,
(4)
so that Vt(λ) equals the expected surplus of the insurer generated in [t, T ], given that the
optimal canceling policy is applied in [t, T ], that λt = λ, and that the contract was not
canceled in [0, t). The optimal expected surplus of the contract is then given by V0(λ0).
In the sequel we will show that there exist λ̃t ≥ λ̃, for t = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1, such that it is
optimal to cancel at epoch t iff λt > λ̃t. We therefore first present the following proposition,
which provides a recursive evaluation of the expected value of the surplus at time L, given
that the optimal policy is applied.
Proposition 1. When the optimal canceling policy is applied, the expected value of the in-
surer’s surplus generated over the lifetime of the insurance, equals:
V0(λ0) = −cpT + µmax{λ̃− λ0 +R0(λ0), 0}, (5)
where λ̃ is as defined in (3), and R0(.) is determined recursively as follows: For all λ > 0,
RT−1(λ) = 0,
Rt(λ) = E[ max{λ̃− λt+1 +Rt+1(λt+1), 0} |λt = λ ], (6)





Proof. We show by induction that, for all λ > 0:
Vt(λ) = −cp(T − t) + µmax{λ̃− λ+Rt(λ), 0}, t = T − 1, T − 2, . . . , 0. (7)
At time t = T − 1, there is only one period left, so that either L = T − 1, or L = T .
Given the expected surplus in the last period for these two options, this yields:
VT−1(λ) = max
{










∣∣∣∣λT−1 = λ] }
= max{−cp, p− λµ}
= p+ max{−(1 + c)p, −λµ}
= p− µλ̃ + µmax{λ̃− λ, 0}
= −cp+ µmax{λ̃− λ +RT−1(λ), 0}.
Now assume that equation (7) holds for t+ 1, . . . , T − 1. Applying (4) then yields:
Vt(λ) = max
{










∣∣∣∣ λt = λ] }
= max
{
−cp(T − t), p− λµ− cp(T − t− 1)
+ µE
[
max{λ̃− λt+1 +Rt+1(λt+1), 0}
∣∣λt = λ]}
= −cp(T − t) + max
{
0, (1 + c)p− λµ + µRt(λ)
}
= −cp(T − t) + µmax{λ̃− λ+Rt(λ), 0}.
Thus, the validity of (7) has been proven for t = T − 1, T − 2, . . . , 0.
The above proposition yields the optimal expected surplus, i.e. the total expected surplus
obtained when the optimal canceling policy is applied. From its proof, we can immediately
infer the optimal canceling policy.
Corollary 1. If the contract has not been canceled yet at time t, then the policy that maxi-
mizes the insurer’s expected surplus in (t, T ] is as follows:
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• cancel (resp. do not cancel) if λt > λ̃ +Rt(λt) (resp. λt < λ̃+Rt(λt)),
• either cancel or do not cancel if λt = λ̃+Rt(λt).
Proof. Suppose λt = λ. It follows immediately from the proof of Proposition 1 that:
• If λ̃ − λ + Rt(λ) < 0 (resp. > 0), then the expected surplus that maximizes Vt(λ)
corresponds to the case of canceling (resp. not canceling) the contract at epoch t.
• If λ̃− λ+Rt(λ) = 0, then the two decisions yield the same expected surplus.
From now on we assume that the insurer only cancels the contract if this decision yields
an expected surplus that is strictly higher than the surplus corresponding to not canceling.
In other words, in the case of indifference according to Corollary 1, the insurer is assumed
not to cancel the contract. The following results can be easily adapted to the case where the
insurer always cancels in the case of indifference. It is important, however, that this decision
is taken consistently. It now follows immediately that.
Proposition 2. The optimal contract length is given by:
L =





In order to calculate the optimal canceling policy from (8), one has to solve the recursion
in (6). As stated above, at time t, λt+1 is a random variable. Therefore, in order to solve
the recursion, we first determine the conditional distribution of λt+1, given λt.




λ(t+ t0) + n
t+ t0 + 1
∣∣∣∣ λt = λ )
=
(




t+ t0 + 1
)λ(t0+t)( 1




Proof. The prior distribution of claim arrival rate Λ at epoch t, as given by (1), is charac-
terized by the following two parameters:
α(t) = t0 + t,
β(t) = λ0t0 +Nt.
Now let υ(.;α(t), β(t)) denote the pdf of this gamma distribution. Then for all t = 0, 1, . . . , T−
1, and n ∈ IN, one has:
P (Nt+1 −Nt = n|λt = λ) =
∫ ∞
0
P (Nt+1 −Nt = n |Λ = x)υ(x;α(t), β(t))dx
=
(










Notice that it follows from (2) that, for given λt = λ, one has:








Now (9) immediately yields the desired result.
In the sequel we show that, for all t, the function Rt(.) is non-increasing. We therefore
need the following lemma.
Lemma 2. If λ > τ , then λt+1 |λt = λ is stochastically larger than λt+1 |λt = τ .
Proof. We have to show that:
P (λt+1 > x|λt = λ) ≥ P (λt+1 > x|λt = τ ), for all x ∈ IR.
Define α = t0 + t, β = λα, and γ = τα, and denote




p(n, α, β) =
(









for n ∈ IN, α > 0, and β > 0.
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Let k be such that:
{n ≥ 0 : z(n, α, γ) > x} = {k, k + 1, . . . }.
Since β > γ, it follows from (10) that:
{n ≥ 0 : z(n, α, β) > x} ⊇ {k, k + 1, . . . }.
Hence, it is sufficient to show that
∞∑
n=k
p(n, α, β) ≥
∞∑
n=k
p(n, α, γ), for all k ∈ IN. (12)
First we prove that p(n, α, β) ≥ p(n, α, γ) implies that p(n+1, α, β) ≥ p(n+1, α, γ). Assume
that p(n, α, β) ≥ p(n, α, γ). Then
















(α + 1)(n+ 1)
p(n, α, γ)
= p(n + 1, α, γ).
Let l = min{n ∈ IN : p(n, α, β) ≥ p(n, α, γ)}. Then it follows that p(n, α, β) < p(n, α, γ) for
0 ≤ n < l. It is clear that (12) holds for k ≥ l, and for 0 ≤ k < l, we have
∞∑
n=k
p(n, α, β) = 1−
k−1∑
n=0
p(n, α, β) ≥ 1−
k−1∑
n=0




Proposition 3. For all t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1, the function Rt(.) is non-increasing on IR+.
Proof. Let λ > τ > 0. For t = T − 1, we have by definition that RT−1(λ) = RT−1(τ ) = 0.
Now assume that the statement is true for t + 1, t + 2, . . . , T − 1. It then follows that
max{λ̃ − λ + Rt+1(λ), 0} is an non-increasing function of λ. By Lemma 2, we know that
λt+1|λt = λ is stochastically larger than λt+1|λt = τ . By a basic property on stochastic order
relations (see e.g. [9], pp. 405) it follows immediately that Rt(λ) ≤ Rt(τ ).
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The fact that Rt(.) is non-increasing allows to show that it is optimal for the insurer to
cancel at a given epoch iff the number of observed claims exceeds a certain threshold value.
These threshold values are presented in the following theorem.











, for t = 1, . . . , T − 1. (13)
Moreover, these canceling limits satisfy d1 ≤ d2 ≤ · · · ≤ dT−1.
Proof. We know from Corollary 1 that it is optimal not to cancel at time t iff:




, and since Rt(.) is non-increasing, it follows immediately that:
λt ≤ λ̃ +Rt(λt) ⇔ Nt ≤ dt, for t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1, (15)
where dt is given by (13).














In this case, it immediately follows that:
λ0t0 + dt




≤ λ̃ ≤ λ̃ +Rt+1
(
λ0t0 + dt


















, it follows from



















Since the left-hand side of (16) is strictly positive, it follows that:
λ̃−
λ0t0 + dt








Therefore, in both cases, it follows from (13) that dt+1 ≥ dt.
It now follows immediately that:




, t = 1, . . . , T − 1,
where dt are as defined in (13).
It is seen from the above corollary, combined with (13) and (3), that in contrast to the
naive policy, the canceling limit λ̃t not only depends on the premium density p, and the
proportional canceling cost, but also on the time instance t, and the parameters λ0 and t0
of the prior distribution at date zero. Notice furthermore that, since Rt(.) ≥ 0, Corollary 1
implies that:
λ̃t ≥ λ̃, (17)
so that the naive policy always cancels earlier than the optimal policy.
In the remainder of this section we present some analytical results on the effect of the
parameters on the optimal canceling policy, and illustrate these results in a numerical ex-
ample.
Proposition 5. Let C1 and C2 denote two insurance contracts with contract periods T1 and
T2 = T1 − 1, respectively (T1 ∈ IN, T1 > 1), with all other contract specifications being equal
for C1 and C2. Then
R
(1)
t (λ) ≥ R
(2)













∣∣ λt = λ],
for λ > 0, i = 1, 2, t = 0, 1, . . . , Ti−2, and with λt+1 =
λt(t0+t)+Nt+1−Nt
t0+t+1
and λ̃ defined by (3).
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≥ 0 = R(2)T2−1(λ).
Now assume that we have proven (18) for t+ 1, t+ 2, . . . , T2 − 1. This yields
R
(1)















Hence, (18) is valid for t and the result follows by induction.
The above proposition immediately yields the following result.
Corollary 3. Let d(1)t and d
(2)
t denote the optimal canceling limits for the contracts C1 and





t , t = 1, . . . , T2 − 1.
It is clear from (6) and Corollary 1 that the optimal policy only depends on θ and c
through λ̃ = (1 + c)(1 + θ)λ0. The following proposition therefore provides the effect of an
increase in λ̃ on Rt(.).






t (λ) = E
[










t (λ) ≥ R
(2)
t (λ), t = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1, λ > 0. (19)
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Proof. By definition inequality (19) is valid for t = T − 2. Now assume (19) is valid for
t = τ + 1. Then, for λ > 0, we have
R(1)τ (λ) = E
[
max{λ̃(1) − λτ+1 +R
(1)
τ+1(λτ+1), 0}
∣∣ λτ = λ]
≥ E
[
max{λ̃(2) − λτ+1 +R
(2)
τ+1(λτ+1), 0}
∣∣ λτ = λ]
= R(2)τ (τ ).
Hence, (19) is valid for t = τ , and, consequently, the result follows by induction.
Corollary 4. Consider two insurance contracts C1 and C2 that have the same contract length
T and prior distribution for Λ. Let λ̃(1) and λ̃(2) denote the corresponding control-limits of




t denote the optimal canceling limits





t , t = 1, . . . , T − 1.
We conclude this section with a numerical example of the effect of the different parameters
on the canceling limits.
Example
Consider the five insurance contracts with contract parameters shown in Table 1. Contracts
C2–C5 differ from C1 only in one single parameter value. Figure 1 shows Rt(λ) + λ̃ (t =
1, 2, . . . , 8) for contract C1 as a function of λ for contract C1. It follows from Corollary 1
that the intersections with λ, the dotted line, yield the values of λ at which the insurer is
indifferent between canceling and not canceling at epoch t = 1, 2, . . . , 8. These intersections
can be translated into canceling limits dt using formula (13). The canceling limits of contracts
C1–C5 are shown in Table 2.
The second column marked by C∗1 presents the canceling limits that correspond to the
naive canceling rule applied to contract C1. Notice that the naive canceling rule cancels
earlier than the optimal canceling rule (see (17)). The canceling limits of the naive and
optimal canceling rule for C1 are equal only for t = T − 1 = 9, since then one has Rt(λ) = 0.
The canceling limits of contracts C2 and C3 are both higher or equal to the limits of C1.
The reason for this is that both an increase of c or an increase of θ result in an increase
16
Contract
Parameter C1 C2 C3 C4 C5
T 10 10 10 10 15
λ0 2 2 2 2 2
t0 8 8 8 10 8
c 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.03
θ 0.10 0.10 0.15 0.10 0.10
Table 1: Contract parameters










Figure 1: λ̃+Rt(λ) for C1 as a function of λ.
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dt
t C1 C∗1 C2 C3 C4 C5
1 8 5 8 9 8 8
2 10 7 10 11 10 10
3 12 9 13 13 12 13
4 14 12 15 15 15 15
5 16 14 17 17 17 17
6 18 16 19 20 19 19
7 20 18 21 22 21 21
8 22 21 23 24 23 23
9 23 23 24 25 24 25
10 - - - - - 27
11 - - - - - 29
12 - - - - - 31
13 - - - - - 33
14 - - - - - 34
Table 2: Canceling limits
of λ̃, while (λ0, t0) remains unchanged, which leads to higher canceling limits according to
Proposition 6.
The value of t0 in contract C4 is higher (t0 = 10) than the value of t0 in contract C1
(t0 = 8). Consequently, the posterior distribution in the case of contract C4 is updated
more conservatively, and hence more “evidence”, i.e. a higher canceling limit, is needed to
convince the insurer that it is optimal to cancel the contract.
Finally, contract C5 has a longer contract period than contract C1. This implies that
the canceling limits for contract C5 are higher (see Proposition 5). The intuition for this
difference is that, since the remaining contract length is longer, both the canceling costs and
the potential loss when canceling an actually favorable contract are higher.
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4 Implications for Premium Setting
For any given safety loading θ, proportional canceling cost c, and maximal contract length
T , the canceling limits d(T ) := (d1, . . . , dT−1), as defined in (13), can be determined. This
implies that in case of large, client tailored, insurance, the contract can specify a combination
of θ, c, T , and d(T ). Here, for example, a higher θ or a higher c will allow for higher canceling
limits dt, and vice versa. Obviously, these contract specifications affect the expected value of
the insurer’s net profit, as well as the insured’s expected utility of the contract. Therefore,
in the sequel, we study how the contract specifications affect the relation between expected
costs and expected premium income.
In the standard classical risk process, the expected value of the insurer’s surplus at a
given time t is proportional to the expected value of the total claim height up to time t.






so that the expected surplus at the end of the planning period equals:
E[ZT ] = (1 + θ)λ0µT − λ0µT
= θE[ST ].
When the option to cancel is available, the above described relationship no longer holds.
In general, the effective safety loading θL—which equals the fraction of expected surplus
over expected costs, taking into account the optimal canceling strategy and the canceling
costs—differs from the safety loading θ used to determine the premium density at date zero.
We therefore now study the effect of the canceling option on the effective safety loading.
As before, we denote L for the random variable that denotes the optimal lifetime of the
contract, i.e. the time at which it is canceled, or the time until it expires, T , if it is not
canceled. The insurer’s optimal canceling policy implies that:
L =
t, if inf{u ∈ IN : Nu > du} = t < T,T, if Nu ≤ du for all u ≤ T − 1.
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Now, for any given canceling rule d(T ) = (d1, . . . , dT−1), and (subjective) probability distri-
bution of Λ, the distribution of L can be determined. This distribution can then be used to
determine the net expected profit generated by the contract, taking into account its actual
lifetime and the cancellation costs. Since in this section, all expectations are taken at date
zero, we will omit the notation |H0, and denote E[.] for the expected value with respect to
the subjective distribution used at date zero.
Since L is a stopping time w.r.t. the process {Nt : t ≥ 0} it follows that E[NL] = E[ΛL],






Xi − cp(T − L)
]
,
= pE[L]−E[ΛL]µ− cp(T −E[L]).
Taking into account the canceling costs, and the actual lifetime of the contract, the
effective safety loading for the contract equals:
θL =
E[ZL]




E[ΛL]µ+ cp(T − E[L])
− 1.
Notice here that, even when canceling costs are zero, i.e. c = 0, the effective safety loading





which only equals θ if E[ΛL] = λ0E[L] = E[Λ]E[L]. It is clear that, since L depends on Λ,
this equality need not be satisfied.
To conclude, we present a numerical example to illustrate the effect of the availability of
the option to cancel on: the lifetime distribution, the insurer’s expected surplus at the end
of the contract, and the effective safety loading.
Example
Without any loss of generality we will assume that µ = 1, hence the premium density is
given by p = (1 + θ)E[Λ] = (1 + θ)λ0.
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We consider an insurance contract with a fixed time horizon of five periods (T = 5) and
the option, available to the insurer, to cancel at the end of each period at canceling costs
equal to 3% (c = 0.03) of the premium for the remaining contract period. We assume that
the insurer uses a Gamma(4, 16) (λ0 = 4, t0 = 4) prior distribution for the Poisson claim
arrival parameter Λ, hence E[Λ] = 4 and V [Λ] = 1.
Next, we consider eight different premiums resulting from safety loadings:
θ = θn := 0.025× n, for n = 1, 2, . . . , 8.
Figure 2(a) presents the canceling limits dt, t = 1, . . . , 4, for these eight different values
of θ. We see that, for each t, the canceling limit dt increases as θ increases. This also
immediately follows from Corollary 4, since an increase in θ implies an increase in λ̃. In
words, this result can be explained by two effects:
• A higher θ implies a higher premium density p. Since θ does not affect the claim height,
the expected surplus resulting from not canceling is affected positively.
• A higher θ implies higher canceling costs, so that the surplus resulting from canceling
is affected negatively.
The canceling limits for these different values of θ can be used to determine the probability
that the contract will sustain for T periods (see Figure 2(b)), as well as the expected lifetime.
Both are increasing functions of θ.
Table 3 shows some important statistics of the insurance contract for the insurer. The
expected number of claims that the insurer has to cover is given by E[ΛL], which is not equal
to E[Λ]E[L] since, obviously, the lifetime distribution depends on the claim arrival rate Λ.
In our example we see that E[ΛL] < E[Λ]E[L]. This can be explained by the fact that if the
actual claim arrival rate λ is high, relative to the prior expectation λ0, then the contract is
likely to be canceled before the expiration date.
Notice that the effective safety loading θL differs significantly from the safety loading
used to determine the premium density at date zero. The overall effect of an increasing
safety loading θ on the insurer’s expected surplus, E[ZL], is positive, as could be expected.
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(a) Canceling limits dt. (b) Lifetime distribution: P (L = t).
Figure 2: Canceling limits and lifetime distribution for eight different premium levels. The
bars in both figures correspond to safety loadings θ1, . . . , θ8, from the left to the right.
θ E[L] E[ΛL] E[ZL] θL
0.025 4.3598 16.8375 0.9591 0.0567
0.050 4.4046 17.0335 1.3910 0.0813
0.075 4.5664 17.7855 1.7940 0.1006
0.100 4.6666 18.2621 2.2268 0.1216
0.125 4.7116 18.4794 2.6838 0.1449
0.150 4.7621 18.7303 3.1425 0.1675
0.175 4.8294 19.0693 3.6049 0.1888
0.200 4.8639 19.2447 4.0822 0.2119
Table 3: Statistics for the contracts with different levels of θ.
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5 Summary
In this paper we have analyzed a risk process where the insurer has the option to stop
offering the insurance before the end of the planning horizon. Such a type of risk process is
especially suitable to model the situation where the insurer does not have enough knowledge
about the risk process to be able to accurately predict the risks involved. In particular for
large industrial risks, where insurance is client specific, both insurer and insured can benefit
from longer term contracts since it saves renegotiation and contracting costs. However, if
the contract covers multiple periods, then misjudging these risks can imply that the insurer
is committed to an unfavorable contract for a lengthy period. The option to cancel the
contract is a very valuable option in such a case. For the insured, however, this option to
cancel generates an additional risk, since there is no certainty that all future claims will be
covered by the insurer. To compensate for this inconvenience canceling costs have to be paid
to the insured by the insurer.
Also in case of introduction of a new insurance product, offered to a large group of
insureds, information at the start of the planning period may be relatively unreliable, so
that, after a number of time periods the insurer may want to stop offering the insurance at
the given premium system.
In both cases, the insurer is faced with the decision problem whether to cancel the
contract or continue with it. This decision is affected by the history of the risk process so
far, since this information enables the insurer to more accurately predict the future of the
risk process.
For the case of a Poisson claim arrival process with unknown parameter and prior gamma
distribution, we have derived a solution method, using stochastic dynamic programming,
resulting in the optimal canceling policy. The resulting canceling rule depends on the history
of the process only through the total number of claims up to that point in time. We found
that, at a certain decision point, the number of remaining periods is significant for the
insurer’s decision whether to cancel or not. More specifically, we showed that if the canceling
rule prescribes to cancel the contract if more than one periods are remaining, then it will
also prescribe to cancel if there is one period remaining, given that the history of the risk
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process is identical in the two cases.
Taking a certain canceling policy and the insurer’s prior distribution for the claim arrival
rate as a starting-point, contract specifications such as the premium and canceling costs
provide an instrument for the insurer to influence the canceling probability and the expected
profit. In case of precommitment of the insurer, the insured on the other hand, has to
evaluate the expected utility of a contract offered by the insurer, including the canceling
options, and decide whether it is favorable compared to having no insurance contract.
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